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A number of epistemologists have de-
fended doxastic voluntarism, the view that we 
have voluntary control over what we believe. 
defenders of this view allow then for the 
possibility that we can voluntarily commit 
ourselves to propositions. This appears to 
include belief-contravening propositions. 
Typically, belief-contravening commitments 
are themselves taken to be beliefs. Thus, 
these defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow 
that we can at least sometimes efficaciously 
choose to believe propositions that are nega-
tively implicated by our evidence. one of 
the main reasons that doxastic voluntarism 
enjoys a degree of popularity is that it is 
supposed to allow for the evaluation of an 
agent’s epistemic status from a deontological 
perspective. in other words, one can conceive 
of epistemology as normative and based on 
categorical principles that define meritorious 
and nonmeritorious epistemic behavior. The 
basic idea that is alleged to support this view 
is that we think that it is appropriate to hold 
epistemic agents responsible for what they 
believe and if doxastic voluntarism is false, 
then it is inappropriate to hold epistemic 
agents responsible for what they believe. 
The conditional premise of this argument 
is supposed to follow from the epistemic 
analog of the Kantian moral principle that 
“ought” implies “can.” Put more simply, if 
we cannot control our beliefs, then we are 
not responsible for our beliefs. if we are not 
responsible for our beliefs, then it would be 
inappropriate to evaluate our beliefs in terms 
of any deontological epistemic principles.
 in this essay it will be argued that the 
conjunction of epistemic deontology and 
doxastic voluntarism as it applies to ordinary 
cases of belief-contravening propositional 
commitments is incompatible with canonical 
formulations of evidentialism—the view that 
one should only commit to a proposition for 
which one has adequate evidence. The com-
bination of these views entails practical or 
deontic contradictions if belief-contravening 
commitments are understood normally (i.e., 
as beliefs). in this essay Ed and dV will be 
assumed and this negative result will be used 
to suggest that voluntary belief-contravening 
commitments are not themselves beliefs 
and that these sorts of commitments are not 
governed by evidentialism. So the apparent 
incompatibility of the package views noted 
above can be resolved without ceding eviden-
tialism with respect to beliefs.
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2. Epistemic deontologism  
and Evidentialism
 Epistemic deontologism is the view that:
(Ed) our beliefs are justified if, and only if, 
what we believe is epistemically permissible 
for us to believe. And our beliefs are unjustified 
if, and only if, what we believe is epistemically 
impermissible (Steup 2000, p. 25).
This view has enjoyed increasing prominence 
among contemporary epistemologists and it is 
prima facie plausible in that it treats epistemic 
evaluation as a normative endeavor based on 
categorical epistemic principles in very much 
the same way that moral evaluation is a nor-
mative endeavor based on categorical moral 
principles. So according to the epistemic 
deontologist we can lay out these principles, 
and following them entails that our beliefs 
will be epistemically meritorious.
 one such principle is that of evidentialism. 
Evidentialism is the view that one’s justifica-
tion for a proposition is a function of one’s 
evidence. it is canonically understood as 
follows:
(EV) doxastic attitude D toward proposition p 
is epistemically justified for S at t if and only 
if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t 
(Feldman and Conee 2004, p. 83).
So EV is an epistemic norm that governs 
our doxastic attitudes including belief, and it 
implies that one should believe a proposition 
if and only if one has adequate evidence for 
that proposition. As it applies to belief, EV 
is the view that,
(EV-B) The belief that p is epistemically justi-
fied for S at t if and only if believing p fits the 
evidence S has at t.
There are, of course, many other such norms 
that might constitute elements of the full eth-
ics of belief, but for the purposes of this essay, 
we need only have this derived principle at 
our disposal.
3. doxastic Voluntarism
 doxastic voluntarism is the view that 
whether we believe something is a voluntary 
matter. This view is importantly related to 
Ed, because it is widely (although not univer-
sally) believed that it is appropriate to subject 
an agent’s doxastic attitude(s) to evaluation in 
terms of the normative principles that consti-
tute the ethics of belief only if holding those 
doxastic attitudes is a voluntary matter for S.1 
We can only say, for example, that S ought or 
ought not to believe that p, when S’s belief 
that p is a voluntary matter. in other words, 
we can only evaluate S’s belief in this manner 
when believing that p is up to S. So doxastic 
voluntarism is the view that
(dV) whether an agent believes that p or not 
is voluntary.
on standard accounts S has voluntary con-
trol over j-ing if and only if S can control 
whether or not she will j by exertion of S’s 
will.2 So dV is the view that, in at least some 
cases, whether an agent believes p or not is a 
matter of voluntary control on the part of S. 
This view has as a consequence that in some 
contexts c, whether S believes that p is under 
the control of S’s will.
 However, doxastic voluntarism comes in 
two important forms: direct doxastic volun-
tarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism. di-
rect doxastic voluntarism is the view that we 
have direct voluntary control over our beliefs, 
and this means that whether an agent believes 
that p or not is voluntary and that whether an 
agent believes that p is under the control of 
that agent such that the agent does not need 
to anything other than choose to believe that 
p in order to believe that p.3 indirect doxastic 
voluntarism is the view that we have indirect 
control over our beliefs. This means that 
whether an agent believes that p is under the 
control of the agent such that there is some q, 
r, s . . . such that the agent has direct control 
over q, r, s, . . . and q, r, s, . . . bring about 
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the belief that p.4 Ed appears to require only 
that indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, but 
as we shall see, at least some epistemic rules 




 it is beyond dispute that there are a wide 
variety of propositional commitments that we 
can have toward propositions. This includes 
believing, wishing, desiring, considering, and 
so on. However, there is a distinct tendency in 
philosophical discussions of human cognitive 
behavior involving representation—particu-
larly in epistemology—to treat belief as the 
common default attitude involved in numer-
ous types of such behaviors. So on this default 
view, most propositional commitments in 
epistemological contexts are taken to be be-
liefs. one view of belief, then, that is widely 
shared is that the norm of belief is truth and 
thereby EV-B is thought to be a crucial ele-
ment of the ethics of belief in virtue of this 
fact. This is because evidence is the only 
reliable indicator of truth. The problem that 
then arises in the context of dV and EV-B is 
that there appear to be a variety of contexts 
where epistemic agents have epistemically 
meritorious propositional commitments that 
contravene evidentially grounded beliefs al-
ready held by that agent.5 But this appears to 
be epistemically impermissible given EV-B.
 Given Ed, there will be a host of specific 
rules that define the duties that govern our 
epistemic behavior in various contexts. one 
such rule arises out of the AGM theory of 
belief dynamics that Carlos Alchourrón, Peter 
Gärdenfors, and david Makinson developed 
in the 1980s, and a number of related theories 
have arisen as a consequence.6 These theories 
are fundamentally based on the concept of a 
belief state K satisfying the following mini-
mal conditions:
(BS) A set of sentences, K, is a belief state if and 
only if (i) K is consistent and (ii) K is objectively 
closed under logical implication.
The content of a belief state is then defined as 
the set of logical consequences of K. Given 
this basic form of epistemic representation, 
the AGM-type theories are intended to be a 
normative theory about how a given belief 
state that satisfies the definition of a belief 
state is related to other belief states satisfy-
ing that definition relative to (1) the addition 
of a new belief b to K
i
 or (2) the retraction 
of a belief b from K
i
, where b ∈ K
i
. Belief 
changes of the latter kind are termed con-
tractions, but belief changes of the former 
kind must be further subdivided into those 
that require giving up some elements of K
i 
and those that do not. Additions of beliefs 
that do not require giving up previously held 
beliefs are termed expansions, and those that 
do are termed revisions. Specifically, for our 
purposes here it is the concept of a revision 
that is of crucial importance to the issue of 
providing an account of rational commitment 
for conditionals.
 What is important to the topic of this essay 
is that on the basis of such theories of belief 
revision, the defenders of this approach to 
belief dynamics have also proposed a theory 
of rational conditional commitment.7 This 
theory is a normative account of the condi-
tions under which one ought to believe a 
conditional. The core concept of this theory 
is the ramsey Test:8
(rT) Believe a sentence of the form ‘if p, then 
q’ in the state of belief K if and only if the 
minimal change of K needed to believe p also 
requires believing q.9
Even in this quasi-formal form we can see 
what the AGM and other theorists have in 
mind. The ramsey Test requires that we 
conservatively modify our beliefs by adding 
p into our standing system of beliefs and then 
see what the result is. What this theory then 
appears to require of us is that our actual 
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system of beliefs must be altered in order to 
believe a conditional. We must believe the 
antecedent, make the appropriate minimal 
modifications to our belief system, and then 
see if the consequent is believed in that new 
doxastic state. Consider, however, how this 
would work in the case of the large class of 
conditionals with false and known to be false 
antecedents. For example, consider the fol-
lowing conditional: if John McCain had won 
the 2008 presidential election, then the U.S. 
would have engaged in air strikes against 
iran’s nuclear facilities in 2011. According to 
Ed we ought to follow the correct epistemic 
rules and let us suppose that this includes 
rT. According to rT we ought to believe 
this conditional if and only if upon believing 
the antecedent and making the appropriate 
minimal changes in one’s doxastic state, one 
would also believe the consequent. This then 
involves a belief-contravening commitment 
to the proposition that John McCain won the 
2008 presidential election. According to dV 
and the standard view that belief-contraven-
ing commitments are themselves beliefs, we 
are then in a situation where we can believe 
that John McCain won the 2008 presidential 
election in order to follow rT and that com-
mitment is itself a belief. Suppose also that in 
fact that rT yields the result that the McCain 
conditional should be believed. All of this 
then gives rise to the following undesirable 
situation. By EV-B we ought not to believe 
that John McCain won the 2008 presidential 
election but according to rT we ought to 
believe it because according to rT we ought 
to believe the McCain conditional. We can-
not believe the McCain conditional unless 
we believe that he won the 2008 election and 
so we ought to believe that. So we are faced 
with a practical contradiction. Moreover, we 
can again see that in such cases Ed prob-
lematically tells us to follow the categorical 
epistemic rules, but we cannot possibly do 
so because there are two conflicting impera-
tives, and we have an outright contradiction 
entailed by the combination of these views.
5. Possible Solutions  
and the Concept of Acceptance.
 There are several ways that one might deal 
with this situation without ceding Ed, dV, 
and/or EV-B. So let us consider them in turn. 
First, one might attempt to avoid this outcome 
by ranking imperatives. This might then allow 
the defender of Ed, dV, and EV-B to argue 
that rT should be violated and EV-B satis-
fied when attempting to ascertain whether we 
should believe conditionals. one would then 
of course have to propose a plausible alterna-
tive to rT for counterfactuals. The basis for 
this maneuver might then be that EV-B is a 
more fundamental epistemic obligation than 
rT, and so this imperative is ranked lower in 
the hierarchy of our epistemic obligations. 
As such, the contradictions that follow from 
the conjunction of Ed, dV, and EV-B when 
conjoined to rT might be resolved by ap-
peal to the relative rankings of our epistemic 
obligations in this way. However, there does 
not seem to be any obvious and non–ad hoc 
way to do this. There is no clear or natural 
principled ranking of epistemic obligations 
available to us and, more importantly, even if 
there were such a ranking that identified EV 
as more fundamental than rT, it would para-
doxically entail that we ought never to follow 
those lower-ranked rules when it comes to 
belief-contravening commitments, thus ren-
dering them seriously deficient as epistemic 
rules. in the case of rT, we would specifically 
have to conclude that it has no application to 
counterfactuals and that there is some other 
appropriate rule for those conditionals. This 
is of course unacceptable, as that rule would 
seemingly have to conflict with rT because 
it is intended to apply to all conditionals.
 A second way to avoid the implications 
noted above might be to simply deny EV-B. if 
we cede EV-B, then there is no conflict in our 
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following rT. in accord with Ed and dV, we 
could then voluntarily adopt the belief-contra-
vening beliefs that are necessary to satisfy rT 
without violating the epistemic norm EV-B. 
However, this response is not one we would 
like to adopt in light of the widely held view 
that truth is the (unique) norm of belief and 
of justified belief. if we reject EV-B, then it 
will be epistemically permissible to believe 
propositions independent of evidence (which 
is presumably truth-tropic in nature), and it 
is hard to see how those who champion the 
ethics of belief in terms of Ed could endorse 
this severe weakening of their view.
 A third way to defuse the problem of belief-
contravening epistemic rules would be to 
reject all epistemic rules that entail violations 
of EV-B. So one might simply argue that rT 
is not an acceptable epistemic rule and thus 
does not specify an epistemic obligation. As 
we saw in the case of response one, this view 
is ultimately implausible. The defenders of 
rules like rT that involve belief-contravening 
commitments have presented significant and 
often compelling defenses of those epistemic 
norms, and it seems to be a blatantly ad hoc 
response on the part of defenders of Ed and 
dV to suggest that no such view can be cor-
rect because they are at odds with EV-B. one 
might suggest that there are good reasons to 
endorse EV-B, but that does not appear to 
be a particularly good reason to reject rT 
given the sorts of reasons that support it. The 
defender of Ed and dV would have to have 
some serious reasons to question rT that are 
independent of its conflicting with EV-B in 
order to adopt this response, and it is unlikely 
that this would work in all cases of epistemic 
rules that involve belief-contravening com-
mitments.
 A fourth attempt to defuse the problem of 
belief-contravening epistemic rules would 
be to reject rules like rT on the basis of the 
specific claims that they assume direct volun-
tarism and that direct voluntarism is implau-
sible.10 recall rT says that for an arbitrary 
counterfactual conditional, we must believe 
the antecedent of that conditional in order to 
see if the conditional is itself to be believed. 
This means then that whatever antecedent we 
might find as a component of any conditional, 
it must be up to the agent considering that 
conditional whether to believe the antecedent 
proposition or not if the agent is to be able 
to use rT effectively and comprehensively 
as a rule in the sense of Ed. However, if this 
means that believing the antecedent is under 
the agent’s control in the direct sense, then 
one might be tempted to believe that rT as-
sumes an indefensible form of voluntarism 
about propositional commitments and so 
ought to be rejected as a proper epistemic 
rule. This response is, however, deeply prob-
lematic.
 First off, we should note that rT seems to 
be an independently plausible rule for be-
lieving conditionals. However, if we accept 
that any rule that assumes a form of direct 
voluntarism is illegitimate, then we are faced 
with the following problem. Either we must 
reject the independently plausible epistemic 
rule rT on this basis or we must reinterpret 
rT so as to be acceptable. But rejecting rT 
on this basis, given its independent plausi-
bility, seems to be wrongheaded. So, as a 
result, it would appear to be the case that 
rT cannot be understood in terms of direct 
voluntarism because that view is supposedly 
illegitimate as applied to belief. The natural 
response is to then suggest that perhaps rT 
ought to be interpreted in terms of indirect 
voluntarism. interpreting rT in this way, 
however, entails that applying rT involves 
only indirect control over commitments to 
the antecedents of arbitrary conditionals. 
But this interpretation of rT is itself totally 
implausible in the case of counterfactuals. it 
would amount to the view that agents cannot 
entertain arbitrary counterfactual conditionals 
by simply choosing to commit to the ante-
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cedent of a given conditional in the direct 
sense of control. So suppose that John is 
trying to determine whether or not he ought 
to believe the following conditional: if JFK 
had not been assassinated, then the Vietnam 
conflict would have been shorter in duration. 
Given this interpretation of rT, John does 
not have direct control over his commitment 
to the proposition that JFK was not assassi-
nated. He only has indirect control over this 
commitment. on this interpretation of rT, 
if it is up to John whether to commit to that 
proposition, John must have direct control 
over some other states that bring about his 
commitment to the proposition that JFK was 
not assassinated, and in order to apply rT, he 
must bring about those states in order to yield 
a verdict about whether or not to believe the 
conditional. Note that given EV-B, the states 
that John has direct control over cannot be 
the relevant evidence or grounds for belief in 
the antecedent proposition, for he knows it is 
false and most certainly does not need to look 
for misleading evidence in order to entertain 
the hypothetical claim.11 The assumption that 
John would have to find misleading evidence 
in order to engage in committing to the an-
tecedent of the counterfactual in question so 
that he could evaluate the conditional via rT 
is utterly implausible and psychologically 
pathological. The latter charge derives from 
the recognition that this view entails that John 
would have to engage in knowing and willful 
self-deception to apply rT so interpreted. 
More straightforwardly, it simply does not 
seem to be the case that John needs to do 
anything at all other than (directly) commit to 
the proposition that JFK was not assassinated 
in order to assess the conditional. He most 
certainly does not need to seek the advice of 
a therapist, read conspiracy books, or undergo 
brainwashing, and so on in order to adopt 
that commitment and thus assess whether or 
not to believe the conditional. So, contrary 
to the basis of this objection, we do seem to 
be able to entertain the belief-contravening 
antecedents of counterfactual conditionals at 
will in the direct sense, and rT is a reasonable 
epistemic rule for how to do this. Thus, ob-
jecting to rules like rT on the basis that direct 
doxastic voluntarism is implausible in this 
case. Some form of direct voluntarism does 
not seem reasonable in such cases, and so rT 
is in that respect a reasonable deontological 
epistemic rule in addition to its plausibility 
in other respects. But as we shall see momen-
tarily, what this objection really suggests is 
the third possibility, that rT does not involve 
belief in the antecedents of conditionals at all 
and the above discussion has been carefully 
constructed so as to suggest this in its strate-
gic uses of “commitment” instead of “belief” 
and “direct/indirect voluntarism” instead of 
“direct/indirect doxastic voluntarism.”
 So for the reasons just given, none of three 
responses suggested so far appears to be espe-
cially workable as a solution to the problem 
presented here. There is, however, a fourth 
response open to those that defend Ed, dV, 
and EV-B. This response involves denying 
the standard account of belief-contravening 
commitments, entertaining a restriction on 
EV as a result and a small modification of 
rT. rT mentions belief but it is not clear that 
this is really an essential element of the rule, 
and this suggestion arises out of the fourth 
objection dealt with immediately above. one 
might adopt the view that rules like rT do not 
involve belief-contravening beliefs at all. in 
effect, one can deny the standard account of 
belief-contravening commitments. Thus, one 
can defuse the problematic implications of 
Ed, dV, and EV-B without (i) introducing an 
ad hoc and problematic ranking of epistemic 
obligations, (ii) rejecting all epistemic rules 
that involve belief-contravening commit-
ments, or (iii) being forced to accept direct 
doxastic voluntarism. This can be realized by 
interpreting belief-contravention as involving 
some commitment other than belief that is 
not veristic. Veristic propositional attitudes, 
then, are those that have truth (uniquely) as 
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norms.12 Belief and knowledge are examples 
of veristic commitments. The aim of veristic 
propositional commitments is truth, and this 
is why EV applies to them. So it is crucial to 
this response that we must restrict EV in the 
following way:
(EV’) Veristic doxastic attitude D toward 
proposition p is epistemically justified for S 
at t if and only if having D toward p fits the 
evidence S has at t.
importantly, nonveristic propositional com-
mitments include forms of acceptance. There 
are several extant accounts of acceptance, 
but the best-known account was introduced 
by Cohen (1992). on this view, accepting p 
is a propositional commitment characterized 
by the following important features (among 
others):
A1. Accepting p is voluntary.
A2. Accepting p is nonevidential.
A3. Accepting p is not a commitment to the 
literal truth of p.
A4. Accepting p is subjectively closed under 
implication.
Accepting p is then something like adopting 
p for pragmatic reasons or “trying out” p in a 
cognitive sense. What is most important here 
is that since acceptance is governed by A2 
and A3, it is clearly not a veristic doxastic at-
titude. So EV’ does not apply to the accepting 
of propositions. This, then, suggests that we 
can refine rT as follows in a way that makes 
this rule perfectly compatible with EV’:
(rT’) Believe a sentence of the form ‘if p, 
then q’ in the state of belief K if and only if the 
minimal change of K needed to accept p also 
requires accepting q.
Nothing in principle is lost in recasting this 
epistemic principle in this way. So under-
stood, it is an epistemic obligation in accor-
dance with Ed, it does not involve violating 
dV, and it does not conflict with EV-B. So one 
can maintain that we have epistemic obliga-
tions involving belief-contravening commit-
ments while accepting Ed, dV, and EV-B, 
provided one is willing to reject the standard 
account of belief-contravening commitments 
and reinterpret epistemic rules that involve 
them in terms of nonveristic commitments 
like acceptance.
NoTES
1. See Alston 1988 and Steup 1986.
2. See Steup 2000, p. 28, in support of this analysis.
3. See Steup 1986, 71.
4. See ibid.
5. Here the example developed will concern the ramsey Test for conditional acceptance. other rea-
sonable examples of such rules include the plausible scientific rule that we should adopt theories that, 
while known to be false, are approximately true, and the rule that we should adopt theories that, while 
known to be false, depend on acceptable idealizations.
6. See Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985, Gärdenfors 1988, and Levi 1996.
7. See Gärdenfors 1981 and 1988.
8. See ramsey 1929 (1990).
9. one might think that this presentation of rT is uncharitable. This is because rT is ambiguous in the 
following sense. What rT requires of us is either (1) that our actual system of beliefs must be altered 
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by believing the antecedent of a conditional in order to believe a conditional, (2) that we hypothetically 
modify our beliefs in order to accept a conditional, or (3) that we add the hypothetical belief that p to 
our belief system in applying rT. But neither interpretations (2) nor (3) can possibly be acceptable. 
interpretation (2) of rT entails a vicious regress. if we take interpretation (2) of the ramsey Test to mean 
that in considering whether to accept A > B, we should hypothetically add A to our standing system of 
beliefs K, make the appropriate revisions in terms of the AGM postulates (or other similar postulates), 
and then see if B is in the resulting system of beliefs, then in order to accept A > B, we must accept the 
following additional conditional (d): if i were to add A to my standing belief system K, then i would 
believe K’ . However, in order to see if we should believe d, we must apply rT to d. in the case of d, 
we must follow rT and thus we get a vicious regress. So (2) is not a defensible interpretation of rT. if 
we instead adopt interpretation (3) of rT and read it as meaning that in order to see if we should accept 
A > B we must add the hypothetical belief A, then we are owed an account of what hypothetical beliefs 
are; how they interact with ordinary beliefs; and how we can assess conditionals using them without 
introducing the sort of vicious infinite regress noted here. This is, however, a difficult task to satisfy in 
terms of the AGM theory in particular, as that is a theory of belief revision the postulates of which all 
concern beliefs and not hypothetical beliefs. But no such account has been offered. So interpretation 
(1) of rT seems to be correct, and this is further supported by what ramsey actually himself says in 
ramsey 1990. in the relevant footnote ramsey says that, “if two people are arguing ‘if p, then q?’ and 
are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on 
that basis about q (pp. 154–155).” Similarly, Stalnaker (1968) interprets rT as, “First, add the antecedent 
(hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain 
consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent), finally, consider whether or 
not the consequent is then true” (p. 106). These claims are themselves ambiguous, but for the reasons 
cited above, neither interpretation (2) nor interpretation (3) of these claims is acceptable, and so the 
objection that my interpretation of rT is uncharitable is rendered moot. As things stand, rT must be 
interpreted in terms of (1). otherwise, it is unsatisfiable (in terms of (2)) or it crucially depends on an 
undefined concept that the AGM postulates say nothing about (in terms of (3)). See Shaffer 2011 and 
Shaffer 2012 for more on this contention.
10. See Steup 1986, pp. 70–74.
11. See ibid., pp. 71–72.
12. We should be careful to note that there are two possible interpretations of veritism with respect to 
propositional attitudes. Pure veristic propositional attitudes are those that have truth as a unique norm. 
impure veristic propositional attitudes are those that have truth as a norm, but may also have other 
norms. The view assumed here is that belief and knowledge are pure veristic propositional attitudes 
and this is the normal view of the matter for those who adopt representational views of belief and who 
defend EV. Truth is the norm of belief and evidence is evidence for truth. For example, Conee and 
Feldman’s (2004) version of EV appears to be purely veristic in nature in this sense. Pure veritism 
about belief might, however, be denied, but it is hard to see how that would avoid the problem posed 
here. impure veritism about belief might permit pragmatic (or other nonevidential) reasons for belief 
and so might permit the possibility that rules like rT might be satisfiable without violating EV-B. But 
these sorts of reasons would have to be nontruth-tropic. in support of this point, zemach (1997) has 
shown that pragmatic reasons cannot be evidential in the sense of providing reasons for truth. So the 
problematic epistemic rules that involve belief-contravening commitments would all have to involve 
purely nonveristic factors, but this is not what the defenders of rT, for example, have in mind. rT is 
designed to show us when we should believe that a conditional is such that it should be believed to be 
true. So for the purposes of this essay, belief and knowledge will be assumed to be purely veristic.
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